
As concerns mount that artificial intelligence could make creating dangerous pathogens even easier, U.S. government–funded scientists who make and manipulate DNA sequences will face tougher regulations. The National Policy for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening, released on 5 November, will for the first time require these researchers to procure synthetic nucleic acids and benchtop synthesis equipment from U.S.-approved suppliers. Those vendors must verify their customers’ identities and screen orders for potentially dangerous sequences that, for example, could encode toxins or pathogens.
The policy, whose requirements will roll out in stages over the next 340 days, replaces a voluntary system of self-regulation, and some biosecurity experts view it as an important, if partial, step in the right direction. “It’s great, because it does something instead of nothing,” says Kevin Esvelt, a biotechnologist and biosecurity expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “It will make it harder to misuse DNA.”
Still, some key wording is vague, he and others say, and the policy only applies to federally funded scientists. But Esvelt believes it will spur synthetic biology companies to comply with the screening requirements for all customers, making it more difficult for “competent lone wolves” to obtain synthetic DNA sequences for nefarious purposes.
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Others caution that the new rules provide an imperfect shield against bioterrorism. “We’re only addressing the U.S. with this policy,” says Gigi Gronvall, an immunologist and biosecurity expert at Johns Hopkins University. Gronvall also worries that by focusing on synthetic DNA, the regulations do not address other ways a would-be bioterrorist could create a dangerous pathogen. “There’s all kinds of other ways to manipulate DNA that do not require you to make it from scratch,” she says.
Scientists have been making synthetic DNA for decades, but advances in technology over the past few decades have made it possible to produce longer and longer sequences that can be assembled into genes or even whole bacterial and viral genomes. Biology labs frequently order these sequences online from synthetic biology companies, but benchtop DNA synthesizers now enable scientists to create what they want in-house, further eroding obstacles to bioterrorism.
In 2010, the U.S. government released guidelines for synthetic biology companies, recommending they vet customers and screen orders for potentially dangerous DNA sequences. The guidelines were voluntary, and various biosafety groups have called for greater oversight. But many companies—most notably the members of an industry group called the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, which is responsible for most DNA synthesis worldwide—agreed to comply anyway.
Now, “Screening moves from voluntary to verified,” says Drew Endy, a synthetic biology researcher at Stanford University. That’s “a real step forward.”
But Esvelt points out the policy only requires screening for DNA sequences 50 base pairs or longer. A would-be bioterrorist, he argues, could easily stitch together a dangerous sequence from much smaller fragments ordered from multiple different suppliers. Esvelt says he has built an algorithm capable of screening sequences as short as 30 base pairs for their risk potential and made it freely available. “That’s the main flaw in an otherwise pretty great policy,” he says. “Don’t bother building a fence if there’s going to be an obvious huge gap in it.”
Another concern is that the policy requires DNA synthesis companies to verify customers’ identities, Esvelt notes, but doesn’t explain in detail how: “It’s very underspecified in that regard.” Gronvall also points out the policy only applies to newly built DNA synthesis equipment, leaving countless existing benchtop machines open to misuse. “These things are everywhere,” she says. And although the policy encourages manufacturers to offer trade-in or buy-back programs for now obsolete machines, it doesn’t mandate them.
The policy places the onus on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to ensure the new regulations are correctly enforced—without necessarily providing the resources for them to do so. “NIST is being asked to do a lot of work here, on a short clock, only if money is available,” Endy says. “I’m guessing they don’t have the money.”
Esvelt also predicts the policy will create additional work for institutional biosafety officers: “I think the greatest flaw in this policy is that it doesn’t come bundled with extra funds for institutional biosafety committees and biosafety officers, who do very important work and are dramatically underfunded.”
Gronvall, for her part, thinks too much emphasis has been placed on trying to prevent a specific type of bioterror threat, noting that screening for synthetic DNA, though necessary, is “just one tool.” More resources, she argues, should be devoted to vaccine development, hospital preparedness, and other measures that will be necessary to respond to future pandemics—be they natural or humanmade.
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