what is now the Haas School of Business of the University of California at Berkeley. The speaker? Ivan Boesky, who would be convicted just eighteen months later in an insider trading scandal.1 Millions of people saw Wall Street, and Gekko’s monologue became part of popular culture. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of young people were inspired to go into finance as a result of Douglas’s performance.
This dismayed Stanley Weiser, the co-writer of the screenplay, who met many of these young people for himself. As Weiser wrote in 2008 at the height of the financial crisis, “A typical example would be a business executive or a younger studio development person spouting something that goes like this: ‘The movie changed my life. Once I saw it I knew that I wanted to get into such and such business. I wanted to be like Gordon Gekko.’ . . .
After so many encounters with Gekko 1 Bob Greene, “A $100 Million Idea: Use Greed for Good,” Chicago Tribune, December 15, 1986; James Sterngold, “Boesky Sentenced to 3 Years in Jail in Insider Scandal,” New York Times, December 19, 1987. 1. Introduction In the 1987 Oliver Stone film Wall Street, Michael Douglas delivered an Oscar-winning performance as financial “Master of the Universe” Gordon Gekko. An unabashedly greedy corporate raider, Gekko delivered a famous, frequently quoted monologue in which he described the culture that has since become a caricature of the financial industry: The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works.
Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms, greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge, has marked the upward surge of mankind. And greed, you mark my words, will not only save Teldar Paper, but that other malfunctioning corporation called the USA. Despite the notoriety of this encomium to enlightened self-interest, few people know that these words are based on an actual commencement speech delivered in 1986 at FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2016 17 Andrew W.
Lo The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial Industry The author thanks Tobias Adrian, Brandon Becker, Chyhe Becker, Roland Bénabou, Natasha Burns, Jakob de Haan, Leigh Hafrey, Joseph Haubrich, Claire Hill, Ed Kane, Joseph Langsam, Hamid Mehran, Adair Morse, Christine Nolder, Antoinette Schoar, Tracy Wang, seminar participants at Harvard Law School and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and participants at the October 2014 FAR meeting, the May 2015 Consortium for Systemic Risk Analytics, and the November 2015 Wharton Culture and Ethics Banking Workshop for helpful comments and discussions; and Jayna Cummings for editorial assistance. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/author_disclosure/ad_epr_2016 _gordon-gekko-effect_lo.html. Andrew W.
Lo is the Charles E. and Susan T. Harris Professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management, director of the MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering, and principal investigator at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. alo@mit.edu 18 The Role of Culture in the Financial Industry admirers or wannabes, I wish I could go back and rewrite the greed line to this: ‘Greed is good. But I’ve never seen a Brinks truck pull up to a cemetery.’”2 What makes this phenomenon truly astonishing is that Gekko is not the hero of Wall Street—he is, in fact, the villain. Moreover, Gekko fails in his villainous plot, thanks to his young protégé-turned-hero, Bud Fox.
The man whose words Weiser put into Gekko’s mouth, Ivan Boesky, later served several years in a federal penitentiary for his wrongdoings. Nevertheless, many young people decided to base their career choices on the screen depiction of a fictional villain whose most famous lines were taken from the words of a convict. Culture matters. This is a prime example of what I propose to call “the Gekko effect.”
It is known that some cultural values are positively correlated to better economic outcomes, perhaps through the channel of mutual trust.3 Firms with stronger corporate cultures, as self-reported in surveys, appear to perform better than those with weaker cultures, through the channel of behavioral consis- tency, although this effect is diminished in a volatile environment (Gordon and DiTomaso 1992; Sørensen 2002). However, not all strong values are positive ones. The Gekko effect highlights the fact that some corporate cultures may transmit negative values to their members in ways that make financial malfeasance significantly more probable. To understand these channels and formulate remedies, we have to start by asking what culture is, how it emerges, and how it is shaped and transmitted over time and across individuals and institutions. 2.
What Is Culture? What do we mean when we talk about corporate culture? There are, quite literally, hundreds of definitions of culture. In 1952, the anthropologists A.L.
Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn listed 164 definitions that had been used in the field up to that time, and to this day we still do not have a singular definition of culture. This article does not propose to solve that problem but merely to find a working definition to describe a phenomenon. Kroeber and Kluckhohn settled on the following: “Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embod- iments in artifacts” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, 35). Embedded in this seemingly straightforward and intuitive 2 Stanley Weiser, “Repeat after Me: Greed Is Not Good,” Los Angeles Times, October 5, 2008. 3 For example, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006). definition is an important assumption that we shall revisit and challenge below—that culture is transmitted rather than innate—but that we will adopt temporarily for the sake of exposition and argument.
A corporate culture exists as a subset of a larger culture, with variations found specifically in that corporate entity. Again, there are multiple definitions. The organizational theorists O’Reilly and Chatman define corporate culture as “a system of shared values that define what is important, and norms that define appropriate attitudes and behaviors for organizational members” (O’Reilly and Chatman 1996, 166), while Schein defines it in his classic text as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group . . . that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to [the group’s] problems” (Schein 2004, 17). The key point here is that the distinctive assumptions and values of a corporate or organizational culture define the group.
These assumptions and values will be shared within the culture, and they will be taught to newcomers to the culture as the correct norms of behavior. People who lack these values and norms will not be members of the shared culture, even though they may occupy the appro- priate position on the organizational chart. In fact, these outsiders may even be viewed as hostile to the values of the culture, a point to which we will return. It is clear from these definitions that corporate culture propagates itself less like an economic phenomenon—with individuals attempting to maximize some quantity through their behavior—and more like a biological phenomenon, such as the spread of an epidemic through a population.
Gordon Gekko, then, can be considered the “patient zero” of an epidemic of shared values (most of which are considered repugnant by the larger society, including Gekko’s creator). This biologically inspired model of corporate culture can be generalized further. Three factors will affect the transmission of a corporate culture through a group: the group’s leadership, analogous to the primary source of an infection; the group’s composition, analogous to a population at risk; and the group’s environment, which shapes its response. The next sections will explore how the transmission of values conducive to corporate failure might occur, how such values emerge, and what can be done to change them.
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2016 19 3. Values from the Top Down: Authority and Leadership Who maintains the values of a corporate culture? Economics tells us that individuals respond to incentives—monetary rewards and penalties. From this mercenary perspective, corporate culture is almost irrelevant to the financial realities of risk and expected return.
However, the other social sciences offer a different per- spective. A corporate culture directs its employees through authority—sometimes called “leadership” in the corporate world—as much as through financial incentives, if not more so. The great German sociologist Max Weber broke down authority into three ideal types: the charismatic, who main- tains legitimacy through force of personality; the traditional, who maintains legitimacy through established custom; and the legal-rational, whose legitimacy comes from shared agreement in the law (Kronman 1983, 43-50). We can see that Gordon Gekko is almost a pure example of Weber’s charis- matic authority; however, at this point in our discussion, the style of authority is less important than the fact of authority.
According to Herbert A. Simon’s classic analysis of admin- istrative behavior, a person in authority establishes the proper conduct for subordinates through positive and negative social sanctions (Simon 1997, 184-5). These sanctions, in the form of social approval or disapproval, praise or embarrassment, may be the most important factor in inducing the acceptance of authority. Also important is the sense of shared purpose, which, in the military, is sometimes called esprit de corps.
People with a sense of purpose are more likely to subordinate themselves to authority, in the belief that their subordination will aid in achieving the goals of the group. How much economic incentive is needed for an authority figure to influence the members of a culture into bad behaviors? Experimental social psychology gives us a rather disturbing answer. In the infamous Milgram experiment, originally con- ducted by the psychologist Stanley Milgram at Yale University in 1961, volunteers administered what they believed were high-voltage electric shocks to a human experimental subject, simply because a temporary authority figure made verbal suggestions to continue (Milgram 1963).
Of these scripted sug- gestions, “You have no other choice, you must go on,” was the most forceful. If a volunteer still refused after this suggestion was given, the experiment was stopped. Ultimately, twenty-six out of forty people administered what they believed was a dan- gerous, perhaps fatal, 450-volt shock to a fellow human being, even though all expressed doubts verbally and many exhibited obvious physiological manifestations of stress; three even experienced what appeared to be seizures. One businessman volunteer “was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse . . . yet he continued to respond to every word of the experimenter, and obeyed to the end.”
Milgram’s volunteers were paid four dollars plus carfare, worth about fifty dollars today. Even more notorious is the Stanford prison experiment, con- ducted by the Stanford University psychologist Philip Zimbardo in 1971. In the two-week experiment conducted in the basement of the Stanford psychology department, Zimbardo randomly assigned volunteers to the roles of guards and prisoners (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 1973a, b). Almost immediately after the experiment began, the “guards” started to behave in a dehumanizing way toward the “
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