Since September 15, 2026, Wiz Research has been tracking Gheist: a new campaign performing mass abuse of compromised GitHub tokens. The attack commits a workflow named sync-check to every repository to which each token has access. The workflow seeks to print the repository's secrets into its own workflow log. Then, the tool downloads the log through the GitHub API and deletes the run seconds later. The tool's API requests carry the user agent gheist, which gives the campaign its name.
We have recovered more than 13,500 planted branches from more than 850 compromised accounts, ranging from personal projects to enterprise organizations' private repositories.
A recent GitHub control has been blocking the exploitation in public repositories, but we've observed successful exploitation and follow-on activity in private repositories and GitHub enterprise environments.
As of October 24:
How the attack works
For each repository, the tool creates a branch named ci-sync- plus six random characters, then commits .github/workflows/sync-check.yml with the message ci: sync config. The commit is unsigned and authored as the token's owner. The push event triggers the workflow:
Three details make it work:
Because the secrets leave through GitHub's own API, there is no attacker domain or outbound connection to block.
In enterprise organizations, we saw the tool cycle through tokens of several users and automation accounts within minutes, clone private repositories before planting the workflow, and hours later, cloud credentials from the same organization used to enumerate AWS Secrets Manager.
How the payload evolved
Two variants of this attack have been observed in parallel. They can be distinguished via the branch names.
Tool A uses a hexadecimal suffix and the plain payload.
Tool B uses a base36 suffix, added timeout-minutes: 6 and the environment matrix within hours of its first run on September 28, and modifies the selected payload per repository.
On October 19, Tool B added echo X | base32 -w 120 between the dumps, which prints LAFA==== as a separator, likely for the operator's log parser. Hours later it pushed a second job, sync-host, with runs-on: self-hosted, apparently only to repositories with a registered self-hosted runner. It writes three helper files (.gdmp_pat, .gdmp_patg, .gdmp_sweep) and logs each stage under a ===== gdmp-pivot: <stage> ===== header:
Host details and crontab.
However, this job is buggy: it looks for the wrong runner key file, its URL-credential regex is broken, and it doesn't collect GCP or Azure tokens.
GitHub's approval hold and private repositories
Since July 28, 2026, GitHub has held potentially malicious workflow runs in public repositories until a collaborator approves them. Every public Gheist run we checked, across all variants including the self-hosted job, sits at action_required. The control worked, and the malicious payloads never ran.
Unfortunately, that hold doesn't apply to private repositories or GitHub Enterprise Server. There, GitHub audit logs show runs on ci-sync-* branches completing and then being deleted by the gheist user agent. CloudTrail shows the organizations' own workflows running on those branches and assuming AWS roles, which proves Actions executed without approval.
For defenders, that last signal finds Gheist without any GitHub logs, as shown below.
Other activity on the same accounts
This campaign is leveraging compromised GitHub access. The same accounts are used by other actors and campaigns, which demonstrates how compromised credentials can move throughout the threat actor ecosystem. We've observed overlaps with the following campaigns:
The credential sources we could trace fit this picture: infostealer logs, and tokens exposed in earlier supply-chain compromises such as the Trivy compromise in March.
Note: Gheist is distinct from GhostAction, which uses different workflow files and exfiltrates secrets to 193.32.204[.]199.
Which actions should security teams take?
Hunt
Respond
Harden. Require reviewers on environments with production secrets, scope OIDC trust policies to protected branches or environments, use GitHub Apps or short-lived fine-grained tokens instead of personal access tokens, and run self-hosted runners as ephemeral hosts without Docker socket or unrestricted metadata access.
Indicators of compromise
How can Wiz help?
The Threat Center advisory includes an Event Explorer query covering planted commits, Gheist activity in GitHub audit logs and cloud role assumptions from attacker branches. Wiz Defend detects the activity with rules including "New Workflow Completed And Deleted In Short Time Span", "Workflow Pushed With Secret Dump" and "Commit Created With Known Malicious Commit Message".